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Affirmative Action in the Workplace:
The Significance of Grutter?
BY REBECCA HANNER WHITE*
INTRODUCTION
T he Supreme Court's decision last term in Grutter v. Bollinger'
answered important questions about the affirmative use of race in
the educational context. I have been asked by the editors of the Kentucky
Law Journal to explore the impact the decision is likely to have on
affirmative action in a different context--employment. Simply put, to what
extent does Grutter affect a public or private employer's ability to volun-
tarily adopt an affirmative action plan in order to diversify its work-
force?2
The short answer, of course, is that the Grutter decision does not
directly apply to the affirmative use of race or other protected characteris-
tics in the workplace.' The Court was careful to limit its discussion to the
*Interim Dean and J. Alton Hosch Professor of Law, University of Georgia.
B.A. 1976, Eastern Kentucky University; J.D. 1981, University of Kentucky.
'Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
2 My focus thus is not on affirmative action as a court-ordered remedy or on the
scope of affirmative action under Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319
(Sept. 24, 1965). Instead, it is on the extent to which an employer may choose to
employ race-conscious measures to increase diversity in the workplace.
3 Immediate reaction to the decision from some commentators was that Grutter
would have little impact. Michael R. Triplett, Affirmative Action: Lawyers,
Scholars Differ on Likely Impact Split Decision will have on Workplaces, DAILY
LABOR REPORT No. 121, at AA-5 (June 24, 2003). According to Professor Sam
Estreicher, "the decisions have 'no legs beyond educational diversity' and that the
workplace would likely be unaffected by the ruling." Id. Another commentator,
Edward Blum, agreed, viewing the decision as "a 'narrow opinion,' with little
impact on the workplace." Id. Others saw the decision as more influential.
According to Paula Brantner of Workplace Fairness, "while the decision did not
have a direct connection to employment law, the ruling allows employers and
employees to understand how the Supreme Court views discrimination and
workplace diversity." Id. As the following suggests, my own views are closer to
that of Ms. Brantner.
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question before it, specifically "[w]hether diversity [was] a compelling
interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race in selecting
applicants for admission to public universities."4 The Court pointedly stated
that "[c]ontext matters" 5 when deciding whether race-based classifications
were constitutional. Whether it would consider racial diversity a compel-
ling enough reason to justify race conscious decision-making in other
contexts, including employment, was left for another day.
Nonetheless, I believe the decision will be front and center, as it should
be, in discussions about affirmative action in the workplace.6 The affirma-
tive use of race in employment is one of this country's most contentious
issues, and while the Court has addressed affirmative action as a remedy for
prior discrimination, it has not addressed the extent to which an employer
may base decisions on the desire to obtain or maintain a racially diverse
workforce. However, the Grutter Court's acceptance of diversity as a
compelling state interest in the educational context suggests it may be
receptive to that argument in the workplace as well. Complicating matters
is the extent to which a constitutional analysis of diversity in the workplace
may vary from a statutory one.
This essay will not attempt a normative discussion concerning the
affirmative use of race by employers. Rather, I hope to provide an overview
of some of the legal issues that distinguish affirmative action in the
employment context from affirmative action in the educational context,
with a particular look at Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and with
4 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2335.
5Id. at 2338.
6 Peter Schuck defines affirmnative action as "a program in which people who
control access to important social resources offer preferential access to those
resources for particular groups that they think need special treatment." Peter H.
Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present, and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
1, 5 (2002). That definition works well for the purposes of this Article.
7 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (2000). Another statute,
§ 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), prohibits race discrimination in the making and
enforcement of contracts. Because the employment relationship is contractual, §
1981 applies to race discrimination in the workplace. It appears that if an
affirmative action plan is valid under Title VII, racially motivated decisions made
in conformance with the plan will not violate § 1981. See Schurr v. Resorts Int'l
Hotel, Inc., 196 F.3d 486, 498-99 (3d Cir. 1999). If, however, affirmative action
would be permissible under the Constitution but impermissible under Title VII, see
infra note 8, Grutter suggests no violation of§ 1981 would exist. Challenges to the
law school's affirmative action plan in Grutter had been brought under § 1981 and
Title VI, as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2332.
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a particular focus on diversity as a justification for workplace affirmative
action.
I. TITLE VII AND THE VOLUNTARY USE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits public and private
employers' from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
... race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."9 As originally enacted, no
exception for the "affirmative" use of race was contained on the face of the
statute. But the Supreme Court, in United Steelworkers v. Weber,'0 held that
in certain circumstances race could be considered in the workplace without
violating Title VII.
At issue in Weber was Kaiser Aluminum's decision" to reserve fifty
percent of the openings in a craft training program to black employees. The
company's plan was to continue setting aside the openings until the
percentage of black craftworkers in the company mirrored the percentage
of blacks in the surrounding labor market. At the time the plan was
adopted, Kaiser's craft workers were almost all white. Kaiser previously
had hired only persons with craft work experience, and because blacks had
been excluded from craft unions, very few blacks had the necessary
experience to be hired by Kaiser into the craft positions. The training
program, and the reservation of fifty percent of the places in it to blacks,
was an effort to "eliminate traditional patterns of racial segregation."' 2
Rejecting an argument that the literal language of Title VII prohibited
this consideration of race, the Court held the plan "falls within the area
of discretion left by Title VII to the private sector voluntarily to adopt
Finding that § 1981 and Title VI's prohibitions were "co-extensive with the Equal
Protection Clause," the Court dismissed those claims as well. Id. at 2347
(discussing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389-91
(1982)). Accordingly, for purposes of this Article, my focus will be on the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII.
842 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The statute, as originally enacted, reached only private
employers but was amended in 1972 to reach public employers as well. Thus,
public employers must conform their conduct not only to the Constitution but to
Title VII as well.
9 Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
1 United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
" The company did not act unilaterally but adopted this program through
collective bargaining with the employees' union. Id. at 197-98.
1 d. at 201.
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affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbal-
ance in traditionally segregated job categories."' 3 In so holding, the Court
emphasized the purpose of the statute, 4 which was to "integrat[e] blacks
into the mainstream of American society" by opening job opportunities "in
occupations which have been traditionally closed to them."' 5 "It would be
ironic indeed," said the Court,
if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice
and intended to improve the lot of those who had 'been excluded from the
American dream for so long,' constituted the first legislative prohibition
of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.16
In upholding the plan, the Court further noted the plan, aimed at
remedying prior discrimination against black workers, did "not unnecessar-
ily trammel the interests of the white employees."' 7 The plan would not
result in the termination of white workers; it was temporary, remaining in
place only until racial imbalance had been eliminated; and while the plan
was in place, one-half of the openings in the training program were
available to white workers.' 8
Eight years later, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 9 the Court
upheld Weber and extended it to a public employer's voluntary affirmative
action plan aimed at remedying sex discrimination.2 ° Santa Clara County
had adopted an affirmative action plan aimed, in part, at increasing the
number of women in skilled trade positions; of the 238 skilled craft workers
in the county, none were women. When an opening arose for a dispatcher
in the Roads Division, a skilled trades job, Diane Joyce was selected for the
position, although a male co-worker, plaintiff Paul Johnson, had been
recommended for the job by a group of supervisors. Finding both candi-
3 Id. at 209.
14Id. at 201. Quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,459
(1892), the Court noted "[i]t is a 'familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit nor within
the intention of its makers."'
15 Weber, 443 U.S. at 202-03 (citations omitted).
6Id. at 204 (citations omitted).
1d. at 208.
18 Id.
'9 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
20 Id. at 620 n.2. Although the defendant was a public employer, suit was
brought only under Title VII. No constitutional violation was asserted.
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dates well-qualified for the job, the Agency's Director selected Joyce for
the position in accordance with the county's affirmative action plan.21
The Supreme Court upheld the plan and the decision to promote Joyce.
In so doing, the case followed the two step analysis established in Weber.
First, the Court determined that the plan was aimed at "eliminat[ing]
manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories. 22n
determining whether a manifest imbalance existed, the Court compared the
number of women working in skilled craft positions for the county with the
number of women in the local labor force who had the requisite skills. Such
a comparison, said the Court, "provides assurance both that sex or race
will be taken into account in a manner consistent with Title VII's pur-
pose of eliminating the effects of employment discrimination, and that
the interests of those employees not benefiting from the plan will not be
unduly infringed., 23 Although the Court did not define what was meant by
a "manifest imbalance," it made clear the imbalance need not be great
enough to support a prima facie case of discrimination against the
employer.24 Thus, an employer would not need a prima facie showing of its
own past discrimination to support adoption of an affirmative action plan;
a showing of societal discrimination would suffice.25
Second, the Court determined that the county's plan did not "unneces-
sarily trammel[ ] the rights of male employees or create[ ] an absolute bar
to their advancement., 26 No positions were set aside for women, and sex
was but one factor considered in selecting who was to receive a job. In this
respect, "[t]he Plan," said the Court, "thus resembles the 'Harvard Plan'
approvingly noted by Justice Powell in [Bakke], which considers race along
with other criteria in determining admission to the college."27 Additionally,
21 Id. at 624-25. For an interesting discussion of the facts surrounding the case,
see SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN
WOMEN 388-93 (1991).22 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 628 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 197 (1979)).
23 d. at 632.
24 Id. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
25 This statutory standard differs from the standard that the Court has adopted
for constitutional challenges to affirmative action, where the Court has rejected a
societal discrimination theory as sufficient to support an affirmative action plan.
See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995).26 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 637-38.
27Id. at 638.
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the plaintiff had no "absolute entitlement ' 28 to the position but instead was
only one of a number of applicants qualified for the job. Finally, the plan
was "intended to attain a balanced work force, not to maintain one. 29
Finding the plan consistent with both prongs established in Weber, the
Court rejected the plaintiff s attack on the plan.3"
Johnson is the Supreme Court's last word to date on affirmative action
under Title VII. The Court has approved affirmative action under the
statute when a remedial justification exists and when the interests of
majority group members are not "unnecessarily trammeled." The Court,
however, has not addressed the legality of affirmative action under Title
VII when no remedial justification has been put forward to support the
plan.
The Court had agreed to confront this issue when it granted certiorari
in Taxman v. Board of Education.3" There, the School Board needed to lay
off one teacher in its business education department. Two teachers, one
white and one black, had identical seniority and were viewed as equally
qualified. Invoking an affirmative action plan, the Board chose to lay off
the white teacher in order to maintain diversity. The black teacher was the
only African-American in the department, and the School Board cited its
interest in the educational benefits of racial diversity as justifying the use
of race as a tie-breaker in the case.32
The Third Circuit, en banc, rejected the diversity rationale. 3  The Third
Circuit viewed affirmative action under Title VII as permissible only when
a remedial justification is asserted.34 Viewing affirmative action as a very
limited exception to the statute's prohibition against race-based employ-
ment decisions, the court found the exception justified only when Title
VII's "secondary" purpose of "ending the segregative effects of discrim-
ination" was furthered:
28 id.
29 Id. at 639.
30 The Johnson Court made clear it is the plaintiffs burden to prove an
affirmative action plan is invalid. Affirmative action is not an affirmative defense.
Essentially, taking race or sex into account in conformance with a lawful
affirmative action plan is not "discrimination" within the meaning of the statute.
Id. at 641-42.
31 Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
granted, 521 U.S. 1117, cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997). As inJohnson, 480
U.S. at 616, suit was brought under Title VII; no constitutional claim was asserted.
32 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1551.
33 Id. at 1550.
34 id.
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The significance of this second corrective purpose cannot be
overstated. It is only because Title VII was written to eradicate not only
discrimination per se but the consequences ofprior discrimination as well,
that racial preferences in the form of affirmative action can co-exist with
the Act's antidiscrimination mandate.
Thus, based on our analysis of the Title VII's two goals, we are
convinced that unless an affirmative action plan has a remedial purpose,
it cannot be said to mirror the purposes of the statute, and, therefore,
cannot satisfy the first prong of the Weber test.
35
In rejecting the diversity rationale, the Third Circuit distinguished
affirmative action under Title VII from that permissible under the Con-
stitution and also distinguished the employment setting, even in the
educational context, from "the diversity that universities aspire to in their
student bodies. '36 The court thus viewed Bakke as inapposite to the
employment situation before it.
The court went on to find that the layoff of a tenured nonminority did
not meet the second prong of the Weber test. Quoting the Supreme Court's
decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,37 the court observed
that" '[w]hile hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only
one of several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving
racial equality on particular individuals, often resulting in serious disrup-
tion of their lives.' ,38
After the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Piscataway case, the case
settled and was dismissed by the Court.39 Thus, the issue of racial diversity
in the workplace as a justification for affirmative action under Title VII (or
under the Constitution) has yet to be addressed by the high Court.
I. DIVERSITY AND THE WORKPLACE
Now that the Supreme Court has confirmed that racial diversity is a
compelling state interest in the context of university admissions, what does
that mean for this country's workplaces? Certainly, had the Grutter Court
held that only a remedial justification is sufficiently compelling to justify
governmental use of race, Grutter would have precluded public employers
3 I1d. at 1557.361d. at 1562.
37 Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
38 Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1564 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283).
39Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ. v. Taxman, 522 U.S. 1010, 1010 (1997).
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from relying upon a diversity rationale for race-based decision-making. The
Grutter Court's willingness to embrace diversity as a compelling state
interest in the context of student admissions undoubtedly leaves the door
open for similar arguments to be made in other contexts, including
employment.
The Grutter Court's decision was carefully limited. In embracing the
diversity rationale proffered by the University, the Court relied on the
strong deference it has previously extended to academic decisions, noting
the "special niche" universities occupy in our society and the First
Amendment's protection of "educational autonomy."40 The Court went on
to identify the educational benefits engendered by diversity, such as
"promot[ion of] 'cross-racial understanding,' . . . break[ing] down stereo-
types, and 'enabl[ing] students to better understand persons of different
races."' 4 ' The Court pointed to studies showing that a diverse student
body promotes better learning outcomes and provides for "more enlighten-
ing and interesting" classroom discussions.42 These educational benefits
led the Court to find the University's interest in taking race into account
in its admissions decisions compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny
analysis.
A. Workplace Diversity and the Constitution
So what does Grutter mean for public employers seeking to rely upon
a diversity rationale while conforming their conduct to the requirements of
the Fourteenth Amendment? Certainly it means that a public employer may
argue in favor of race-based employment decisions that are not aimed at
remedying the employer's own prior discrimination. Grutter embraces and
envisions a more forward looking use of race, and while the decision is
issued in the context of student diversity, its approach is not necessarily so
limited.
Although the Grutter Court did rely upon the special deference
academic institutions receive in upholding the University's view that its
interest in student diversity was compelling, this does not mean employers
may not rely upon Grutter. Employers, too, have received considerable
deference from the courts. Employer prerogatives have been recognized and
deferred to repeatedly by the Court in both constitutional and statutory
40 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003).
4 1 Id. at 2339-40 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 137 F. Supp. 2d 821, 850 (E.D.
Mich. 2001)).421d. at 2340.
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contexts.43 Whether this deference will be on a par with that extended to
educators in Grutter remains to be seen, but judicial deference to their
decision-making is something educators and employers have in common.
Moreover, the benefits diversity brings to the classroonm--cross-racial
understanding, elimination of stereotypes, and better understanding of
others44-would seem to be of significant benefit to the workplace as well.
This line of reasoning was not lost on Justice Scalia, who proclaimed in
dissent:
If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use
racial discrimination for the purpose of putting together a "critical mass"
that will convey generic lessons in socialization and good citizenship,
surely it is no less appropriate-indeed, particularly appropriate-for the
civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so.
45
The majority did not necessarily disagree. Justice O'Connor's majority
opinion went out of its way to cite amicus briefs filed by major employers
and by military leaders that stressed the importance of diversity if industry
and the military are to accomplish their goals.46
43 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that if
an employer can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision
would have been made, the employer will not be liable even though the plaintiff
proves that gender played a role in an employment decision); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138 (1983) (holding that when a public employee speaks on matters of
personal interest, the federal courts are not the appropriate forum to review the
employer's decision regarding the employee's speech). For discussion and criticism
of the deference courts have paid to employer prerogatives in the context of
discrimination claims, see Chad Derim & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal
Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause " Employment,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003).
4Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339.
45 Id. at 2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"Citing to briefs filed by 3M and by General Motors Corp., the Court stated,
"[t]hese benefits [of a diverse classroom] are not theoretical but real, as major
American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in today's increasingly
global marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints." Id. at 2340. A brief filed by high ranking
military officers seemed particularly persuasive to the Court; it was discussed at
some length during oral argument, and the Court's opinion noted that "[w]hat is
more, high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders of the United States military
assert that, '[b]ased on [their] decades of experience,' a 'highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle
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In the wake of Grutter, it appears likely the Court would view a public
employer's need to take account of race in at least some situations that go
beyond remedying the employer's own prior discrimination as compelling.
Justice O'Connor previously had suggested she may view a racially diverse
workforce as a compelling interest, at least in the educational setting.47
Justice Stevens has gone even further. In his concurring opinion in
Johnson, he noted the importance of embracing "forward looking consider-
ations" regarding the affirmative use of race and quoted with approval the
achievement of racial diversity as an example of such a goal.48
When called upon to address the issue, the Court undoubtedly will take
the particular employment context into account. A sweeping ruling
concluding that a racially diverse workforce is a compelling interest for all
public employers, Justice Scalia's prediction to the contrary notwithstand-
ing,4 9 appears unlikely. For example, it may be a compelling state interest
for a public school to employ a racially diverse faculty to enhance the
educational experience of its students.50 This rationale would be similar,
although not identical, to that embraced by the Grutter Court and has been
supported by educational experts.5" Moreover, a prison' s need for a racially
diverse correctional staff has been viewed as compelling by a circuit
court,52 as has a police department's need for Hispanic officers.53 And it
appears highly unlikely the Court is prepared to strike down the military's
mission to provide national security.'" Id. (quoting Consolidated Brief of Amici
Curiae Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton at 5, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003)
(No. 02-241)).
41 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 289 n.* (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (distinguishing the remedy of societal discrimination
and providing role models, two rationales that Justice O'Connor viewed as
insufficiently compelling from"the very different goal of promoting racial diversity
among the faculty").
48 See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987).
49 Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2349 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[i]f it is
appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to use racial discrimination
for the purpose of putting together a 'critical mass' that will convey generic lessons
in socialization and good citizenship.., it is... particularly appropriate-for the
civil service system of the State of Michigan to do so").
5 See Ann C. McGinley, Affirmative Action Awash in Confusion: Backward-
Looking-Future-Oriented Justifications for Race-Conscious Measures, 4 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 209 (1998) (describing the amicus briefs filed in Piscataway
documenting the educational benefits of a racially diverse faculty).
51Id. at 228.
52 Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
53 Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002).
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admitted use of affirmative action to increase the number of minority
officers.54 But what is decidedly more difficult is determining when such
compelling circumstances exist. Suffice it to say that after Grutter, it
appears that public employers, in at least some settings, will be able to
successfully argue they have a compelling interest in a racially diverse
workforce. As Justice O'Connor observed in Grutter, "context matters,"55
and the particular workplace context will likely be outcome determina-
tive.
B. Diversity and Title VII
Even if the Court were to embrace diversity as a compelling state
interest for public employers in the context of a constitutional challenge to
affirmative action, the Title VII claim, applicable to public and private
employers alike, would remain. Public employers thus face two distinct
challenges to their use of affirmative action-a constitutional challenge and
a statutory one. Private employers must contend only with statutory
constraints.
As the law presently stands, the constitutional standards for affirmative
action in the workplace differ from those under Title VII. Recall that in
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 6 the Court upheld the county's
affirmative action plan even though there was no showing of prior
discrimination by the employer; a societal discrimination theory sufficed
under Title VII to support the employer's adoption of the plan.5 7 And yet
the Court has found that societal discrimination is not a compelling enough
state interest to justify affirmative action under a constitutional analysis. 8
Thus, as the law presently stands, employers have more freedom under
Title VII to engage in remedially-based affirmative action than the
constitution permits. Put simply, a private employer can engage in
affirmative action in situations where a public employer, constrained by the
Constitution, cannot.
"The U.S. military establishment is the work setting where affirmative action
has been particularly pervasive and arguably most successful." Schuck, supra note
6, at 9. During oral argument in Grutter and Gratz, the Court paid particular
attention to the military's use of affirmative action, and the Court cited the
military's practice with apparent approval in Grutter. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at
2340.
" Id. at 2338.
56 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
"I d. at 641-42.
58 See sources cited supra note 25.
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This analysis would suggest that were the Court, employing strict
scrutiny, to view diversity as a compelling state interest for a public
employer, it necessarily would find the public (and private) employer's use
of race statutorily permissible as well. After all, Johnson provides more
freedom to engage in affirmative action under Title VII than the Constitu-
tion permits. Thus, if diversity is a compelling interest for a public
employer, Johnson could be read to suggest the statute will be at least as
accommodating as the Constitution.
But that is not necessarily the case. In Piscataway, the Third Circuit's
focus on the statutory language and legislative history of Title VII caused
it to find a diversity rationale inconsistent with Title VII.59 That court
viewed Weber and Johnson as approving a very limited exception to the
literal language of Title VII prohibiting racially motivated decisions, an
exception justified only because it furthered the statutory purpose of
remedying past discrimination. Thus, without a remedial purpose, the Third
Circuit found the affirmative use of race statutorily prohibited.60
Neither Weber nor Johnson categorically holds that affirmative action
must be remedially-based to be statutorily permissible.61 The question
simply was not before the Court in either case. Nevertheless, it is true
that the Weber Court, and even Justice Stevens' concurrence in Johnson,
frankly acknowledged that affirmative action appeared to conflict with the
literal language of the statute.62 This is an important point, given the
Court's increasingly textualist approach to statutory interpretation.
Nor is the issue clarified by Congress' reference to affirmative action
in the 1991 amendments to Title VII, in which the following provision was
added:
Nothing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affinative action, or conciliation agreements,
that are in accordance with the law.
6 3
59 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
60 Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F. 3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
granted, 521 U.S. 1117, cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1010 (1997).
61 As Justice Stevens observed in his Johnson concurrence, the case "does not
establish the permissible outer limits" of affirmative action under Title VII.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 642.
62 See Michael J. Yelnosky, Whither Weber?, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
257, 258-61 (1998) (noting the grudging approach to affirmative action in both
Weber and Johnson).
63 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 116, 102 Pub. L. No. 166, 105 Stat. 1071,
1079 (1991).
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This statutory language is ambiguous, even in the context of Weber and
Johnson. It certainly could be read as a congressional incorporation of
those decisions into the statutory framework, endorsing the rationale of the
Court, or the statute could be viewed as taking no position on affirmative
action at all.' In any event, since the Court had not addressed the use of
diversity as a justification for affirmative action under the statute, Section
116 provides little guidance on how best to resolve the issue.
Nonetheless, the Grutter Court's refusal to restrict affirmative action
only to remedial purposes in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
suggests it will follow a similar approach in interpreting the statute. It
seems unlikely the Court would interpret a statute aimed at achieving equal
opportunity as precluding a public employer's use of race in situations
where its need to do so is compelling.
An additional issue merits discussion. Will the Court interpret Title VII
as permitting employers more flexibility than is constitutionally available?
In other words, even if diversity is not a compelling state interest in the
context of a constitutional claim, might the statute permit an employer to
make employment decisions aimed at achieving racial diversity? The
Johnson Court's view that the affirmative use of race under the statute was
more permissive than under the Constitution, at least for remedial purposes,
suggests the answer is yes. After all, private employers are not constrained
by the Constitution and thus, absent statutory limits, would be free to
engage in race-based decision-making. Moreover, as mentioned above, the
Court has repeatedly emphasized Congress' intent to preserve employer
prerogatives to the greatest extent possible.6' An expansive approach to
affirmative action under the statute, permitting employers to voluntarily
decide whether or not to affirmatively take race or sex into account for
diversity purposes, would be consistent with this statutory aim.'
This wide-ranging use of "diversity" by private employers, as a result
of the Grutter decision, was also predicted by Justice Scalia. As he causti-
cally noted, "surely private employers cannot be criticized-indeed, should
be praised-if they also 'teach' good citizenship to their adult employees
through a patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in
hiring. 67
64 For discussion of this statutory provision, see Michael J. Zimmer, Taxnan:
Affirmative Action Dodges Five Bullets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 230-33
(1998).
65 See sources cited supra note 43.
66 See Schuck, supra note 6, at 86-87, who advocates allowing private employ-
ers more flexibility in their use of racial preferences.
67 Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2349 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Employers in recent years have promoted diversity as a means of
maximizing profits. As has been observed, "[r]ather than taking steps to
increase the representation of women and minorities in their work forces
to redress previous discrimination, employers are increasingly asserting the
right to make race and sex-conscious decisions to reap the competitive
advantages associated with a more diverse work force."68 In other words,
diversity is often good for business, and thus many employers would
welcome the opportunity to make employment decisions aimed at
increasing the diversity in their workplaces.69 To that end, it is not
surprising that a number of corporations and other business entities filed
amicus briefs with the Court in Grutter on behalf of the University of
Michigan.7"
Two statutory provisions in Title VII, however, are problematic. First,
the 1991 Civil Rights Act amended Title VII to provide that business
necessity is not a defense to a claim of intentional discrimination.7 The
statute generally does not permit an employer to discriminate even when it
has very good business justifications for doing so. Second, the statute does
permit an employer to discriminate on the basis of sex, religion or national
origin if a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") exists.72 The
BFOQ defense is a very narrow one, permitting an employer to make
employment decisions based on protected characteristics only when the
essence of the employer's business demands that sex, religion, or national
68 Ann C. McGinley & Michael J. Yelnosky, Board of Education v. Taxman:
The Unpublished Opinions, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 205, 207 (1998).
69 As Professor Schuck has observed, business
leaders emphasize the benefits of ethno-racial diversity in a global market,
and the programs are promoted by powerful internal and external constitu-
encies, including some customers. The programs also tend to advantage
large companies by imposing onerous reporting, staffing, and other com-
pliance costs on smaller competitors who cannot bear them as easily. Finns
also see affirmative action as a safe harbor sheltering them from Title VII
claims, helping them to 'keep the peace' and avoid adverse publicity.
Schuck, supra note 6, at 61 (citations omitted).
" Amicus briefs were filed on behalf of over 75 companies including 3M,
American Airlines, Boeing, Coca-cola, DaimlerChrysler, Dow Chemical, Hewlett-
Packard, Microsoft, Nike, Pepsi, and Xerox. These briefs argued that "individuals
who have been educated in a diverse setting are more likely to succeed, because
they can make valuable contributions to the workforce." Brief for Amici Curiae 65
Leading American Business at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No.
02-241 & 02-516).
7' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2000).72 d. § 2000e-2(e).
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origin be taken into account and only when all or substantially all members
of the protected group would be unable to perform the job.73 Thus, the
focus is on the worker's ability to perform tasks that go to the essence of
the employer's business. If the employee can do the job, no BFOQ will
exist, even if the employer could make more money by following an
exclusionary hiring policy. More important, there is no BFOQ for race.
Congress's decision not to provide a BFOQ for race may suggest it was
unwilling to permit employers to take race into account even when strong
business justifications for doing so were present. Furthermore, a diversity
rationale motivated by profit maximization, when applied to race- or sex-
based diversity efforts, looks much like rationales proffered and rejected in
the BFOQ context.74 Thus, employers wishing to employ racial preferences
for the sake of diversity will need to show something other than a profit
rationale. That a car dealer could sell more cars with a racially diverse
workforce than with a more racially homogenous one is unlikely to
convince a court that the employer is entitled under the statute to prefer
members of one race over another when hiring new additions to its sales
staff.75
Does Congress's rejection of a BFOQ for race, and the very narrow
BFOQ that exists for sex and national origin, doom a diversity-based
approach to affirmative action under the statute? Not necessarily. 76 After
all, the Johnson Court did not view lawful affirmative action as discrimina-
tion within the meaning of Title VII. Rather than viewing an affirmative
action plan as an affirmative defense, it viewed affirmative action as a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.77
71 See Int'l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991)
(holding that the BFOQ exception was meant to be an extremely narrow exception
to the general prohibition of sex discrimination contained in Title VII); see also W.
Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321 (1977). The BFOQ analysis is not unlike the compelling state interest analysis
employed in equal protection clause claims. See William R. Bryant, Note,
Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona Fide Occupational
Qualfication Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 219-28
(1998).
71 See Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)
(rejecting sex discrimination as a BFOQ rationale); Smallwood v. United Airlines,
Inc., 661 F.2d 303 (4th Cir. 1981) (rejecting economic considerations as the basis
for a BFOQ with respect to age discrimination).
71 See, e.g., Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11 th Cir. 1999).
76 See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict
Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1216 (2002).
77 See discussion supra notes 57-64.
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One thus could attempt to distinguish the affirmative and nondiscrimi-
natory use of race or sex for diversity purposes from the discrimination the
BFOQ defense is aimed at sheltering.7 8 But courts must be careful not to
permit a diversity-based approach to affirmative action to eviscerate the
narrow boundaries of the BFOQ or to permit employers to take race into
account under a "business necessity" rationale. Perhaps only in situations
in which the employer's interest could be viewed as compelling within the
meaning of strict scrutiny analysis should a diversity-based approach to
affirmative action be statutorily acceptable.
CONCLUSION
Grutter's impact on the workplace is an open question. In thinking
about the issue, it is important to distinguish constitutional claims from
statutory ones. It may be, however, that the result under both claims will
and should be parallel. No doubt there will be instances in which a
compelling need will exist for an employer to engage in race-conscious
decision-making, even when no remedial interest is present. Grutter
suggests the Court will be sympathetic to such needs, whether the claim is
constitutionally or statutorily based. The challenge will be to identify a
diversity rationale that can co-exist with Title VII's goal of eliminating
intentional discrimination, even when "good business reasons" to discrimi-
nate are present.
7 See Schuck, supra note 6, at 6 (asking whether affirmative action is "simply
another form of non-discrimination"); see also John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity,
Affirmative Action and theAnti-Discrimination Principle: The Philosophical Bases
for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 423 (2002).
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